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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

IN REPLY REFER...

AGDA (M) (10 Dec 69) FOR OT UT 693328

18 December 1969

**SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, US Army  
Support Command, Saigon, Period Ending 31 July 1969 (U)**

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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**KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General**

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Saigon  
APO 96491

AVCA 3GN GO S

28 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Support Command, Saigon  
for the Period Ending 31 July 1969 RGS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

THRU:

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (ACSFOR), Department  
of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) SECTION 1. Operations: Significant Activities

a. (C) Command

(1) (C) The United States Army Support Command, Saigon (USASUPCOM, SGN) and its subordinate commands continued combat service support operations during the ninety-two (92) day reporting period, 1 May 1969 through 31 July 1969. The mission of the command remained unchanged, although supported strength showed a decrease of approximately 5,000 to a current total of approximately 235,000. Colonel Louis Rachmeler, OrdC, replaced Colonel John E. Murray, TC, as Deputy Commander on 22 June 1969. In addition Colonel Ernest A. Hinojosa, TC, joined the command on 28 May 1969 as Chief of Staff.

(2) (U) A new four building headquarters complex for the command was officially opened on 29 May 1969. BG Arthur Hurov, Commanding General USASUPCOM, SGN, joined MG L. B. Ramsey, former Deputy Commanding General 1st Logistical Command, in opening the new offices which replaced temporary quarters that were once seven barracks and a mess hall.

(3) (U) Distinguished visitors to the command are listed at Inclosure 1.

b. (C) Personnel, Administration, Morale and Discipline

(1) (C) The command strength on 1 May 1969 was 917 officers, 265 Warrant Officers and 18,764 Enlisted men (Total 19,946). On 31 July 1969 the strengths were 825 Officers, 282 Warrant Officers and 17,515 Enlisted Men (Total 18,622). Significant shortages of enlisted men

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continue to persist in vehicle drivers (64B), duty soldiers and ammunition apprentices (57A and 55A). It is recognized that many of these MOSs are short world-wide.

(2) (U) Special Services (Inclosure 2)

(3) (U) Chaplain

(a) (U) A review of the chapel attendance and Character Guidance figures for the quarter ending 31 July indicate an increase in both areas. Weekly chapel attendance has increased from 21.3% of the command population to 33.7%. This increase is attributed chiefly to the efforts of SSC Chaplains in conducting short devotional services during the week in areas of troop concentration and activities. The cooperation of commanders has helped to make the project Street Corner services successful. With the increase in chapel attendance and the active participation of SSC Chaplains in projects Chit Chat, Street Corner and Prayer, the attendance at Character Guidance classes has been affected. In turn, Character Guidance participation affects chapel attendance. Strong command emphasis also attributed to the steady increase of attendance. Character Guidance attendance has increased from 68.1% to 81.6% of the present for duty strength command wide.

(b) (U) A new project initiated by 1st Logistical Command is now in the initial stages of planning. Project HELP is a central telephone number whereby a soldier can call at any time during the day or night for help with personal problems. This is an attempt to alleviate situations that may lead to serious incidents.

(c) (U) Plans are being developed to add a religious retreat program to the R&R facilities at Vung Tau. The Staff Chaplain USASUPCOM, SGN, 1st Log Chaplain and the Vung Tau Sub Area Command Chaplains are drawing up the plans and recommendations.

(4) (U) Provost Marshal

(a) (U) During the quarter the Provost Marshal's Office conducted forty-four physical security inspections throughout the command. In addition, the command has also undergone eight physical security surveys, four 525 inspection Training Reports and one Crime Prevention Survey. The various inspections aided in the performance of effective physical security standards. The deficiencies noted were corrected and follow-up inspections to check corrective action are being scheduled during the next reporting period.

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(b) (U) Class I points throughout the command were inspected to insure proper physical security measures were being accomplished. Emphasis was placed on documentation to insure that the requesting unit was authorized to receive Class I from the ration points. The deficiencies were noted and follow-up action is being scheduled.

## (5) (U) Safety

(a) (U) Beginning FY 70 a monthly accident summary was published and distributed to the units. The initial summary covered the period 1 July to 25 July 1969 and continues thru the 25th of each month thereafter. The summary presents the accident experience as shown by each major subordinate command for the preceding month.

(b) (U) In order to improve on the timeliness and accuracy of the accident reporting system, the Safety Office has established the policy of receiving a phone-in report on an accident within 24 hours after the occurrence. The phone-in report will be followed by an Accident Report (DA Form 285) within 5 days of the accident. Units late in submitting reports are required to submit a letter of explanation as to why they were not on time. Along with this policy the correctness of the accident report is being stressed.

(c) (U) Because of the many weapons incidents which have occurred within the command, the Safety Officer distributed lesson plans to all units on small arms, up to and including the M-60 machine gun. Weapons training is to be included in unit activities with the requirement that they submit a copy of their training schedules to the USASUPCOM, SGN Safety Office at least three (3) days prior to classes. The trend throughout the Quarter has been downward due to measures taken to preclude such incidents.

(d) (U) The USASUPCOM, SGN Safety Director has initiated a three hour modified Defensive Driving Course which was developed based on the eight hour National Safety Council Driving Course. The modified course is geared to the conditions as encountered in Vietnam. Initially it is being presented to one percent of the personnel from each unit who, in turn, will instruct the remaining drivers of their unit, the target date for completion of this program is 15 October 1969.

## (6) (U) Inspector General

(a) (U) During the Quarter, the Inspector General conducted thirty-one (31) Annual General Inspections. Of the 31 inspected, 30 units were rated satisfactory, one was rated unsatisfactory.

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(b) (U) Two hundred and six (206) requests for assistance and twenty seven (27) complaints were received by the Inspector General during the period with twenty (20) complaints justified. The trend of requests for assistance was in the area of dissatisfaction with job or assignment. Promotion policies, disciplinary matters and excessive details were frequently mentioned. The trend of complaints were in reference to conduct of individuals and promotion policies.

## c. (C) Operations

(1) (C) Operation KEYSTONE EAGLE was initiated during the past quarter. USASUPCOM, SGN is responsible for all logistical actions required to re-deploy those units located in III and IV CTZs which are part of the 25,000 man reduction in force. In order to perform this function, personnel from this headquarters and its subordinate units were dispatched to Dong Tam to assist the 9th Infantry Division, the major unit involved.

(2) (U) Monthly logistical conferences were established during the period at this headquarters in order to promote better understanding between logistical and tactical units and to discuss problems of mutual interest. Because of the large number of customers, three separate conferences are held each quarter, one per month in which they are broken down to all division size units and major commands; separate brigades and like size units; and separate commands with like geographic areas of mission. This arrangement serves two basic purposes; it allows the customers to have more key personnel at the conference and in addition allows this headquarters to tailor each conference to specific areas by separating customers into like groups.

(3) (U) The realignment of units tapered off during the reporting period, however the following force structure changes were made:

- (a) The 41st APU moved from Tay Ninh to Can Tho.
- (b) The 229th S&S Company moved from Phuoc Vinh to Bear Cat.
- (c) The 490th GS Company moved from Vung Tau to Da Nang.
- (d) The 805th Transportation Company moved from Vung Tau to Da Nang.
- (e) The 528th QM Company moved from Vung Tau to Da Nang.
- (f) The 950th APU departed for CONUS.
- (g) The 269th Ord Det (EOD) moved from Dong Tam to Da Nang.
- (h) The 319th Transportation Company departed for CONUS.

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(1) Detachment 2A USAMMAV moved from Dong Tam to Vung Tau.

(4) (U) The work load and function of the units lost to Da Nang had some impact on this command, however, the missions of those units were absorbed by other units of the command. Dong Tam is now in the process of being phased out and by 1 October all US elements will have departed the Dong Tam area. In conjunction with the phase out of Dong Tam a program is under way for a drawdown and phase out of certain activities at Vung Tau. The 148th Ordnance Company will move from Vung Tau to Long Binh by the end of August.

(5) (U) No significant operation plans were developed for the quarter, however all contingency plans were reviewed and updated as required.

(6) (U) Changes in force structure and unit strengths hit an all time high during the quarter. USARPAC General Orders were received implementing the reductions in authorized personnel for 52 units of this command. The changes were brought about by the civilianization program and reduction of military forces to new TOEs or MTOEs. Phase III Standardization played a large part in this reduction and now most of the units of this command are standardized by direction of Department of the Army.

(7) (U) The realignment of the 4th Transportation Command was conducted during May and June and this unit is now operating under its new posture. This realignment consolidated several smaller detachments and formed a Saigon Transportation Battalion Provisional.

## d. (U) Organization

(1) (U) The organizational structure of the command is reflected at Inclosure 3. A troop list is at Inclosure 4.

(2) (U) Unit assignments, in-country activations, attachment, in-activations and reassignments are shown at Inclosure 5.

## e. (C) Intelligence

(1) (C) During the quarter, USASUPCOM, SGN experienced seven (7) convoy ambushes, six (6) of which were minor, with only light enemy fire, and one resulting in heavy damage and casualties. A total of nine (9) vehicles were damaged and seven (7) vehicles destroyed. Resulting

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casualties to personnel of this command were two (2) KIA and twenty (20) WIA. The convoy drivers reacted properly in each instance by continuing to move out of the "kill zone" while directing the maximum amount of fire on the enemy positions. Land mines continue to harass our convoys. The past three (3) months have seen convoy vehicles strike mines, injuring five (5) personnel and causing considerable damage to ten (10) vehicles and destroying one (1).

(2) (C) During the reporting period there were considerable losses of POL due to enemy ambushes. There were 14 5,000 gallon POL tankers damaged or destroyed by RPG and small arms fire directed against convoys. Approximately 70,000 gallons of POL were destroyed.

(3) (C) There were more than 53 separate attacks by fire on USASUPCOM, SGN facilities. More than 588 rounds of rockets and mortars were reported with six (6) attacks accounting for heavy damage and 12 accounting for light damage. A total of seven (7) vehicles were destroyed or damaged in the attacks.

(4) (C) There were five (5) attacks by fire on ammunition storage locations resulting in three (3) USASUPCOM, SGN personnel WIA, and only light damage.

(5) (C) Shipping traffic on the rivers in III and IV CTZ was a prime target of enemy rockets with 18 attacks by fire resulting in eight (8) hits, eight ships were lightly damaged, and eight (8) personnel injured.

(6) (U) Emphasis on security awareness of the units within the command continued. Close coordination was continued with 1st Logistical Command, USARV, II FFV, and Naval intelligence agencies to insure accurate and timely intelligence to our units in III and IV CTZ. Increased attention has been given to timely and accurate reporting of incidents and to insuring alertness and security of the command. Personnel security clearance actions processed during the quarter totaled 701.

## f. (U) Logistics

### (1) (U) Ammunition

(a) (U) The command position of ammunition items has greatly improved since the last reporting period. All quantities are adequate, however, 155mm propelling charges GB (0540), remain in short supply; this is an intensively managed item.

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(b) (U) Recurring irregularities in quantity of ammunition items manifested on incoming ships and quantities received are still being experienced. The problem of in-transit differences has greatly improved. The 1st Logistical Command and this headquarters are still studying the problem of correlating irregularities of manifested quantities with incoming shipments.

(c) (U) Emphasis on training of checker and inventory personnel to increase the accuracy of the ammunition supply points and depot stock records in order to ascertain veracity of records is continuing. Results have been good.

(d) (U) Thru-put of Class V from Cogido barge site during this period was 9,671 S/TON, or 8% of receipts. Continued effort is being applied to increase the percentage.

(e) (U) The retrograde goal of Class V items was not met this past quarter, due to lack of material for construction of retrograde boxes and non-designation of an ammunition ship. Of 1,770 S/TON offered for retrograde 1,612 S/TON were shipped.

(f) (U) Ammunition issues average 40,080 S/TON per month, with a high of 42,055 S/TON in July, while receipts averaged 39,180 S/TON. There was no loss of Class V stock due to enemy action.

(g) (U) During the month of June, USASUPCOM, SGN, closed one ASP (Tan Son Nhut) and began closing two others (Vung Tau and Dong Tam). The command stockage level is not expected to be changed. With the closing of three ASPs, the command will have one ammunition supply depot and eight (8) ammunition supply points.

## (2) (U) Services

(a) (U) The ACoS, Services was created on 2 July 1969, and is composed of Engineering Services and General Services. It includes Engineer plans, repairs and utilities, real estate and construction. Laundry and bath, property disposal, food services and graves registration comprise General Services. The new staff section conforms to the corresponding organization at 1st Logistical Command.

(b) (U) The sheet pile wharf at the Cogido Barge site was completed by the 497th Engineers on 1 June 1969. Phase II of the project which

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called for the installation of four buoys with a capacity of 12 barges each was completed on 1 July 1969.

(c) (U) On 12 June 1969, contractors completed installation of four deep draft anchorages and five barge moorings at the Cat Lai ammunition anchorage. Construction of a dunnage wharf is currently 41% completed and contractor construction of the port administration building was initiated on 21 July 1969.

(d) (U) Maintenance dredging for deep draft vessels and LST slips was completed at Newport port terminal on 16 July 1969. The 700 foot turning basin was finished on 31 May and the barge type RO/RO pier completed and in use 13 June 1969.

(e) (U) The first of four 224,000 CF sections of the cold storage warehouse was completed and released to the US Army Depot, Long Binh on 28 July 1969.

(f) (U) In light of the de-emphasis of Vung Tau as a major logistical base, MCA projects for 51,000 SF of covered storage, 50,000 SY of hardstand and 50,000 SY of roads were cancelled on 4 July 1969. In addition, a project for 10,000 LF of security lighting in the ammunition supply depot was cancelled on 16 July 1969.

(g) (U) In the area of Property Disposal operations, 12,790 S/TON were generated while 20,535 S/TON were disposed of by sale or issue. On 31 July 1969, a total of 8,453 S/TON was on hand.

## (3) (U) Retrograde and Disposal

(a) (U) Repairables evacuated during the period totaled 40,038 S/TON, of which 346 S/TON was shipped by air and 39,692 S/TON by surface transportation. This was a 6,523 S/TON increase over the last reporting period.

(b) (U) 11,084 S/TON of depot excess and station returns were evacuated during the period, a decrease of 4,836 S/TON from the last quarter.

## (4) (U) Petroleum

(a) (U) Six months ago this command recommended thru 1st Logistical Command to SAPOV-MACV that bulk fuel transactions be accomplished at actual temperature converted to 60°F instead of 82.4°F. Two years ago, 82.4°F was set as a Vietnam mean temperature, and commercial fuel contracts were awarded accordingly. Experience has shown that 82.4°F is not the mean temperature for III and IV Corps areas, 90°F is closer to the mean

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temperature. Because of the use of 82.4°F, the government paid for fuel not actually received due to conversion difference between actual and 82.4°F i.e., if the fuel was 90°F when the 82.4°F figure was used, on a 270,000 gallon load of fuel there would be a loss of 750 gallons because 82.4°F was used. Defense Fuel Supply Center has amended the commercial fuel contracts so that actual temperatures will be used instead of 82.4°F for all fuel transactions over 5,000 gallons; the actual temperature will be corrected to 60°F in accordance with applicable regulations. Much of the pipeline losses which occurred because of the use of 82.4°F will be reduced. The government will now pay for only the fuel that is actually received.

(b) (U) A new POL Y-boat/barge contract went into effect 1 July 1969. The contract was awarded to Luzon Stevedoring Corporation and the estimated funding for the contract is \$1,446,130 for FY-70. The Central Navigation and Trading Company did not bid for any part of the POL barge contract. This automatically eliminated the perpetual problem that existed with this company in FY-69 (failure to perform). The tug/barge which will replace the tug/barge that was provided by Central Navigation and Trading Company in FY-69, will be provided by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation. The new tug-barge will carry 210,000 gallons of fuel and 200 drums of fuel/lube oil.

(c) (U) Continuous efforts have been directed to the reduction in drum fuels to the minimum essential operating levels consistent with responsive and economical Class III support. Units are encouraged to use bulk fuels rather than drums because of the much greater man-power requirements necessary to handle the drums. Reduction in the number of drums eliminates the congestion and overcrowding of Class III package yards. It provides more space for the proper storage of other packaged products in accordance with 1st Logistical Command criteria, and it offers less inviting targets to enemy gunners and rocketeers. Drum fuel stockage objectives are reviewed and evaluated on a monthly basis with Support Command recommendation forwarded to 1st Logistical Command for final approval. Demand data for the latest six months period are used as a basis for changing stockage objectives with special emphasis placed on the more recent months of the six months period to identify current trends in consumption rates. Since this management concept was initiated in December 1968, the total stockage objective for drum fuels has been reduced by more than 48% from a high of 1,331,000 gallons in December to the present low of 691,000 gallons in July. A significant reason for this reduction has been the change from the old concept of using drum fuels as contingency or back-up stocks for bulk fuels; some locations now have no drum fuel because there are no customers who want drums. Supply points are now authorized a 10 day stockage objective whereas the 64th Quartermaster Battalion depot at Long Binh is authorized a stockage objective of 15 days for drum fuels.

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(d) (U) On 6 August 1968, a work order request was initiated to PA&E to relocate approximately 2,370 meters 3ea 6" petroleum pipelines from the south side of Route 317 to the north side inside Long Binh Post perimeter. This request was forwarded thru channels and approved. The project was assigned to the 92d Engineer Battalion. A CSD is scheduled approximately 15 August 1969.

(e) (U) A new pier and pipeline was constructed at Vinh Long. The construction of the new pier was needed to off-load dry cargo barges and have a suitable mooring facility for petroleum Y-tankers. In the past a Vietnamese pier in the city of Vinh Long had been used for dry cargo barges and a BC barge was also used for diesel storage. Upon completion of the new pier, the BC storage barge was turned over to the transportation authorities. Since this was the principle storage of diesel fuel, a replacement storage container had to be obtained. One of the steel tanks used as JP-4 storage was converted to diesel storage without impairing the supply of JP-4. The existing tank was about 3/4 of a mile from the new pier and a 6" pipeline had to be layed to transfer the fuel from Y-tankers to the storage tank. The new pier and pipeline has brought about a more stable mooring berth for a Y-tanker and the pipeline and the converted tank eliminates the BC barge which was not intended to be used to store bulk petroleum products.

(f) (U) Improvement/rehabilitation of the 29th General Support Group petroleum facility at Vung Tau has progressed steadily during the reporting period. On-site construction began around 10 June 1969 with the construction of a temporary jetty system. Since the new jetty is being constructed in the same location as the old jetty, a temporary mooring/off-loading facility had to be built so that petroleum supply out of the Vung Tau Tank Farm would not be interrupted. The temporary system is constructed of a barge which is anchored about 500 feet off-shore which serves as a dock/pier, and a pontoon footbridge which connects the pier to the shore line. This system is serving its mission and will suffice until the permanent jetty is completed in October 1969. The construction of the new jetty is approximately 45% complete.

## (5) (U) Maintenance

(a) (U) On 1 May a program for direct exchange of roadwheels for all units in III and IV CTZ was implemented. The DSU's of USASUPCOM, SGN provided a DX point for roadwheels and further evacuated them for repair.

(b) (U) The MHE deadline reached a peak of 23% during May. This is a slight reduction from the previous quarter and efforts continue to reduce the deadline rate to 15% or less. The main problems continue to be the lack of repair parts in the supply system, lack of operator maintenance and a lack of supervision of MHE operations.

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(c) (U) Efforts continue to identify aged and worn equipment which is difficult to maintain and requires more effort than it is worth to keep it operational. All equipment identified as a "DOG" is considered for retrograde and replacement. If the item is supported under the CLSP, an attempt is made to retrograde the item of equipment. This program is helping to reduce the maintenance backlog and if a replacement item is available, will upgrade the overall condition of equipment supported by the command.

(d) (U) On 26 May, the stand down of one medium truck company from the 48th Transportation Group per week for three days was initiated. To date, all medium truck companies have had one stand down. This program was initiated to provide adequate maintenance time to perform all organizational and direct support maintenance on a scheduled basis. Operational commitments were not affected during this stand down period. Coordination with the 48th Transportation Group and the 29th General Support Group provided the necessary planning and prestockage of repair parts. All vehicles were inspected at the beginning of the stand down and again at the end of the three day period. All maintenance was performed on site by organizational personnel and a direct support contact team. The effectiveness of this operations is measured by a 9% increase in the availability rate since 26 May. This program will continue through the next quarter.

(e) (U) A program to repair M127 series trailers was established. This program consisted of a production line repair facility within the 48th Transportation Group to correct organizational deficiencies and repair and reflooring of trailers by the 53d General Support Group. The reflooring program has not been as effective as desired due to the lack of appropriate materials. An attempt to establish a repair and return program for those trailers with Okinawa is in progress.

(f) (U) A reorganization of the headquarters placed staff responsibility for monitoring the retrograde of repairables with the ACofS, Maintenance. Appropriate personnel actions were completed and an addition to the operation and function manual completed.

(g) (U) During the past quarter, three (3) AN/TSM-55A (U-2) calibration vans were deployed to support the Integrated Communications Systems South East Asia (ICS-SEA) sites. These vans are mobile electronic instrument repair and calibration facilities and will provide our customers on site repair and C level calibration of electronic test equipment. Kentron Hawaii Inc. supplies two personnel per van on a contract basis to operate each facility.



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(h) (U) The present programs for the NCR 500 are being replaced by new 100 series programs. These new programs reduce the number of programs that must be used without reducing the management data or the effectiveness of the system.

(i) (U) The maintenance support of the 11th ACR was increased during this period. This was brought about by the environment in which the 11th ACR was employed, namely, virgin jungle and the tactical employment of the track vehicles, specifically tanks - M48A3s, to minimize personnel losses to find and detonate mines and to blaze trails. The direct support battalion was provided with dedicated transportation for repair parts resupply. The maintenance contact team was increased in order to provide two squadrons with a direct support maintenance contact team. A request was forwarded to the 1st Logistical Command for stockage of combat vehicle critical major assemblies in the 185th Maintenance Battalion. These assemblies are to be positioned so as to reduce NORS time due to transportation of repair parts.

(j) (U) The maintenance survey to determine maintenance capabilities, limitations and support requirements was completed. This survey provides a basis for all maintenance planning concerning allocation of maintenance resources within III and IV CTZ. The study is divided into three sections--an overall support command comparison, comparison by battalion and a company/detachment comparison. It has been distributed to the appropriate staff sections and subordinate commands.

## (6) (U) Supply

(a) (U) During this period, the Directorate of Supply was redesignated the Assistant Chief of Staff for Supply. A major reorganization was initiated in which the Services portion of the Supply Operation was placed under the ACoS, Services. This section consisted of the laundry and bath operation and the food service mission.

(b) (U) Plans were made during the period to phase out the Vung Tau Direct Support/General Support area by 31 October 1969. The Class I, II, IV, and VII activities will be reduced or phased out with increased emphasis on support directly from the US Army Depot Long Binh.

(c) (U) Continued emphasis was placed upon the improvement of Self Service Supply Center support. Steady improvement has been noted in the overall percentage of customer fill for SSSC items. The primary deterrent to the attainment of the command goal of ninety (90) percent customer fill continues to be Depot zero balances. Actions have been taken by 1st Logistical Command and the Inventory Control Center to expedite the receipt of critical SSSC items at the Depot. Some improvement in Depot stocks have been noted as a result of their action.

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(d) (U) During the month of April, 1st Logistical Command implemented the "Inventory in Motion" concept as applied to stockage of perishable rations stocked at Depot level. The program, which introduced the optimum or "management" level, enabled the USA Depot, Long Binh, to reduce on hand stocks of perishable rations by a considerable amount. This reduction has enabled the depot to receive incoming shipments of perishables at a much faster rate than previously, since there is now more warehouse space available. The reduction also enables a faster turn-over in stocks, and therefore allows this command to provide a fresher product to the consumer.

(e) (U) Toward the end of April, the Long Binh Bakery became fully operational for the first time since it was heavily damaged by fire in December 1968. Three new commercial ovens were installed - two electric and one diesel; two field ovens provide back-up support. Production has increased to over 1,000,000 pounds of bread per month, which has enabled the cancellation of all commercial bread contracts in the III Corps Tactical Zone.

(f) (U) Resupply of rations to Can Tho was adversely affected by several problem areas which developed during May. Refrigeration difficulties at Vung Tau, which was Can Tho's source of supply, made the Vung Tau Class I point incapable of supporting Can Tho with perishable rations. A backlog of supplies at the Binh Thuy Port and the use of non-dedicated watercraft caused long delays in the resupply of non-perishable rations from Vung Tau to Can Tho. To combat these deficiencies, the Can Tho Class I Point was made a direct depot customer. Dedicated watercraft are now used for transporting both perishable and non-perishable rations from Saigon/Long Binh to Can Tho.

(g) (U) Throughout the past quarter, production and distribution of potable ice was a major problem. During the hot, dry season, contractors found increasing demand for ice among the civilian population. Since the civilians were willing to pay more for the ice than the government could pay, the contractors naturally catered to the civilian needs. In order to sell to both civilians and the government, the contractors began producing a greater number of blocks by only partially freezing the blocks. Due to the way the contracts were worded, the contracting officer was powerless to do anything about it. The contracts called for the vendors to deliver a specific number of blocks of ice but did not specify the weight of the blocks. The problem was alleviated when the contracts were renewed at the beginning of the fiscal year. Payment now depends on the weight of the blocks when they are delivered to the destination. The Class I Points are now weighing a random sample of blocks and annotating the average weight on the delivery tickets.

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## g. (U) Comptroller

(1) (U) Audit on reimbursable support was submitted in May. This audit brought about a 90 day test period of accounting for document numbers transmitted to USARPAC. Audit on POL was completed, however, there has not been an EXIT conference as yet.

(2) (U) The decision to redeploy elements of the 9th Infantry Division during the reporting period required a rearrangement of finance support for nondivisional units within the Delta region.

(3) (U) The FY 69 Cost Reduction Program came to a close with USASUPCOM, SGN achieving validated cost savings in the amount of \$6,739,205.55. This amount of savings came from two actions - Project Clean NCR 500 and the M151A1 differential.

(4) (U) A concerted effort was made during the last quarter to reduce the number of recurring reports. An intensified review of all reports was made in conjunction with 1st Logistical Command which resulted in 20 reports being rescinded during the reporting period.

(5) (U) A management assistance program was instituted. The purpose being to help the command make better utilization of its assets. During quarter, studies were undertaken in the following areas: Relationship of 48th Transportation Group and the 3d Transportation Center, the Transportation Motor Pool and vessel turn-around at Newport Port Terminal.

## h. (U) Public Information

(1) (U) A total of 3,102 releases were generated by this headquarters during the reporting period. Type and number by month are shown below:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>	<u>JULY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
General News Releases	65	67	48	180
Photo Releases	37	58	45	140
Hometown Releases	<u>720</u>	<u>902</u>	<u>1160</u>	<u>2782</u>
TOTAL	822	1027	1253	3102

(2) (U) The Summer Edition of the quality magazine HI-LITE will be distributed in early August. Preparation began on the Summer edition, which should be ready for distribution in November 1969. Publication

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of four unit newspapers continued during the period.

## 1. (C) Training

(1) (C) Project "BUDDY" has been expanded and future expansion is planned in many areas. The concept of the program is to train ARVN personnel with US Forces in logistical procedures. During the reporting period additional ARVN personnel were assigned aboard landing craft utility boats (LCUs). On 15 July 1969, 20 ARVN personnel graduated from the LCU Operations course and graduates were replaced by new trainees. Eighteen ARVN personnel participated in a five (5) week Petroleum and Convoy Drivers Course. A program was initiated to provide on-the-job training (OJT) to harbormasters for a 180 day period, with training being conducted at Saigon, Newport, Cat Lai, Dong Tam and Binh Thuy. A request was also submitted to have an ARVN field grade officer trained in port operations under the personal guidance and supervision of the G-3. Three (3) ARVN personnel are engaged in OJT in the operation of the 100 Ton Crane. Future expansion of the program is to be in the operation of retail gas stations, laundry machine operations and the establishment of Instruct and Assist team, technical service oriented, to give assistance to the ARVN Depots located in the Saigon Area.

(2) (U) Project Skills I: (a) As part of the Project Skills I program this headquarters established a series of quarterly courses. A course in supply, maintenance and transportation is given once a quarter at Vung Tau. Courses are keyed for newly arrived supervisory personnel in the above listed areas, and each course has the capacity of 25 students. The duration of the course is 28 hours; with its purpose to point out peculiarities of operations in this theater.

(b) As of 31 July, five (5) reports have been submitted for the program. The results show that 721 key personnel have been oriented and indoctrinated, 4691 personnel have received training through schools or courses of instruction and 1002 personnel have completed formal on-the-job training.

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## 2. SECTION 2. LESSONS LEARNED: Commander's Observations, Evaluation and Recommendations.

### a. (U) Personnel

#### (1) (U) ITEM: Unit Reassignments.

OBSERVATIONS: Closer coordination and better procedures should be implemented on units identified for reassignment within RVN.

EVALUATION: (a) During a recent operation involving the reassignment of units from USASUPCOM, SGN to another Support Command within RVN, several problems were encountered.

(b) Units had to move with 100% authorized strength. This involved the reassignment into these units of personnel to fill existing vacancies. Since all personnel assigned to the unit when alerted would move with the unit, it was necessary to slot these individuals against positions on the PIR regardless of their MOS. Any slots not filled would be replaced by filler personnel from USASUPCOM, SGN assets.

(c) Those individuals with less than 30 days retainability were pulled out of the units and stayed in USASUPCOM, SGN. Since fillers were furnished by USASUPCOM, SGN, this command lost the equivalent of two people for each slot, instead of one; the filler loss and the DEROS loss.

(d) Initial authorization for shipment of these units was established by higher headquarters and was not consistent with units actual authorization less civilianization. After authorization was straightened out there was insufficient time to properly coordinate with the unit and provide the proper assistance prior to the units move.

RECOMMENDATION: (a) Since the mission of the units identified for reassignment will presumably be approximately the same at the new duty station, and the designated units are functioning at the time of alert, designated units should move with only those personnel assigned at the time of units alert.

(b) Gaining organization should absorb attrition losses of personnel assigned to units which are reassigned within RVN.

(c) Authorization of units being reassigned should not be used as a basis for movement.

(d) Sufficient lead time should be given to major commands to allow for proper coordination and assistance to those units designated for reassignment.

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(2) (U) ITEM: Malutilization of Enlisted Personnel

OBSERVATION: Less stringent controls should be implemented to allow assignment and utilization of personnel to conform with Department of the Army directives.

EVALUATION: In November 1968, higher headquarters instituted a program called Project Fill III whereby the object of the program was to reduce the malutilization rate to 2 percent for the entire command. Individuals were considered malutilized if they were not working within the first 2 digits of their PMOS. The program, if instituted in CONUS or in a non-combat area, would deserve merit. However, two falacies in the program are existant in Vietnam.

(a) AR 600-200 states that a person is considered properly utilized if he is working in either his PMOS, SMOS, or AMOS. Project Fill III does not provide for utilization in SMOS or AMOS, only within first 2 digits of PMOS.

(b) AR 600-200 provides for deviation in utilization of personnel within a combat zone when the situation dictates. Project Fill III provides no deviation.

RECOMMENDATION: Commands be allowed to utilize personnel in accordance with AR 600-200 to insure continuity of operations and mission capability.

(3) (U) ITEM: Reenlistments within Vietnam for Duty and Training

OBSERVATION: Reenlistments for duty and training of enlisted personnel in Vietnam is not achieving desired results.

EVALUATION: Under current Department of the Army policies, individuals may reenlist on initial reenlistment for duty and training in another MOS. This program is not effective in Vietnam. Since there is no training base within Vietnam for those MOSs and an individual's reenlistment commitment must be honored, it is necessary to assign these individuals to positions where more qualified individuals are desired. Two such areas are career groups 71 and 74. The assignment of these personnel for duty and training in these areas bogs down normal operation and does nothing to teach the majority of these personnel the peculiarities and specifics which are a must for the personnel to effectively function. Not only does it hurt the individual but it also hurts the units they are assigned to.

RECOMMENDATION: That Department of the Army policies concerning the reenlistment of personnel for duty and training in specific MOSs be revised

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to defer training in these MOSs until after the individual returns to CONUS or other areas which can provide the desired training.

(4) (U) ITEM: Reconciliation of Records and Reports

OBSERVATIONS: To provide guidance for reconciliation of the following records and reports for each unit of command:

- (a) Morning Report.
- (b) Company Roster.
- (c) PIR.
- (d) MPRJ.
- (e) Data in Machine Division Master Card File.

EVALUATION: (a) A reconciliation of all reports and records was made according to a schedule furnished the units. Two weeks prior to the scheduled reconciliation. A letter was forwarded by the composite team to the unit concerned through the battalion Commanding Officer, establishing a date for reconciliation and requiring a company roster to be furnished with the Morning Report for that day. The Officer In Charge Composite Team furnished an information copy of the letter to Chief, Admin Machines Branch (AMD). Chief, AMD then furnished a listing of the Master File data for the personnel in the unit (Master File Roster).

(b) When the Morning Report, Company roster and Master File Roster were received, the NCOIC of Records Section, three personnel clerks and the company clerk begin verification. The company clerk read the name, grade and ASN from the company roster and recorded the grade in section 14 of a blank DA Form 1. The NCOIC of Records Section and three clerks checked the information against the PIR, the 201 File, the DA Form 20 and against the Master File Roster. The clerk with the Master File Roster read the data from it while the other clerks checked it against the company roster, the 201 File and DA Form 20. Discrepancies were reported to the team chief and resolved immediately.

(c) On completion of the verification (which was completed within 48 hours), the totals on the Morning Report worksheet were compared with the actual Morning Report, Personnel Information Roster and Master File Roster. If discrepancies in the Morning Report strength exist, a request for a one-time strength correction was hand carried, with all supporting

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statistics, to the Chief, Personnel Services Center (PSC). After signature the request was handcarried to USARV Data Services Center for approval.

(d) A written report of all discrepancies not resolved by the Composite Team was furnished to the Chief, PSC, NLT 24 hours after completion of the reconciliation.

RECOMMENDATION: That a reconciliation of all units records and reports be conducted annually.

b. (C) Training

ITEM: Consolidated Logistical Training

OBSERVATION: The establishment of three courses, in supply, maintenance, and transportation and the OJT of ARVN personnel is an attempt to correct deficiencies noted in the training of US and ARVN logistical personnel, within this command. The problems requiring corrective action are not limited to this command, but are theater wide.

EVALUATION: Courses of Instruction with linguist capability, established at a level that has overall theater control of ARVN and US logistical personnel, would eliminate many of the training problems and would release the burden on units for providing qualified instructors to give courses, when the qualified personnel are needed in assigned mission responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATION: That the feasibility of establishing a theater wide school with linguist capability be explored in order to aid in correcting deficiencies of logistical personnel and aid in the successful completion of T-Day Plans.

c. (U) Intelligence. None

d. (C) Operations

(1) (U) ITEM: Assembly Line Method

OBSERVATION: Units may attempt to test, inspect, process and package their own equipment independently, resulting in inefficiency.

EVALUATION: Once the testing, inspecting, processing and packaging begins it should be accomplished in a centralized area with "assembly lines" set up for each type of equipment. Each line should be manned by personnel of the redeploying unit and supervised by qualified technical representatives furnished by 1st Logistical Command. This procedure would allow the job to be accomplished in a more expeditious manner.



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RECOMMENDATION: That the "assembly line" method be utilized for processing equipment of redeploying units.

(2) (U) ITEM: Residual Units

OBSERVATION: Residual units must be taken into consideration when planning transportation requirements.

EVALUATION: When planning transportation requirements for movement of redeploying units within RVN, care must be taken to insure that the requirements of residual units are also included in the overall plan. Requirements for packing containers such as CONEX containers should also be considered at this time. Residual units which are co-located with re-deploying units will have to be relocated if their base is to be closed or turned over to the ARVN and may be easily overlooked when planning transportation.

RECOMMENDATION: That the requirements for residual units to be relocated be included in redeployment transportation planning.

(3) (U) ITEM: Technical Inspection and Classification

OBSERVATION: Technical inspection and classification must be accurate and performed by qualified personnel.

EVALUATION: One relocating unit performed its technical inspections and classification for vehicles and this classification was accepted by its direct support maintenance unit which should have performed this function. Consequently, when the vehicles arrived at the applicable destination within US Army Depot Long Binh IAW condition codes assigned by the unit they were not accepted since the codes were incorrect. Coordination was made, and the vehicles were reinspected and turned in prior to the deadline, however, unnecessary confusion and delay was caused by improper procedures.

RECOMMENDATION: That technical inspection and classification be performed only by the appropriate facility.

(4) (U) ITEM: Preservation Materials

OBSERVATION: Too many types of oils and barrier papers are presently required by TM 750 series manuals.

EVALUATION: Training manuals in the 750 series presently require a large amount of basically similiar types of oils and barrier papers for

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use in preservation of material. The use of a few basic types of oils and barrier papers would greatly expedite preservation processing.

RECOMMENDATION: That oils and barrier papers required for use in preservation be standardized to the extent possible while insuring that preservation standards are met.

e. (U) Logistics

(1) (U) Petroleum

ITEM: Packaged POL Inventory Management System

OBSERVATION: Under the old concept, the 64th Quartermaster Battalion reported all supply activity on packaged petroleum products each day on a "request for punch cards" sheet sent to US Army Depot, Long Binh and computerized on the next available computer cycle. Due to the numerous and complex cycles, it was several days before the computer made a printout. This data was sent to the USAICCV and entered into the computer. By the time a printout useful to the commodity manager was made, the data was at least 10 days old. A product at a dangerously low level at the Class III Depot was often interpreted at the ICC as available on hand. This situation was pointed out by the US Army Auditing Agency in its comprehensive POL study conducted in May and June.

EVALUATION: (a) To correct this inadequate system, a new manual system was developed by 1st Logistical Command. The responsibility for management of packaged POL items was transferred from USAICCV to 1st Logistical Command (Directorate of Petroleum). The commodity manager was reassigned to 1st Logistical Command to manage packaged POL products on a manual basis.

(b) A Weekly Package POL Supply Activity Report is prepared from the stock record cards of the 64th Quartermaster Battalion and forwarded to 1st Logistical Command. This report reflects weekly data as of 1800 hours each Saturday and the 25th day of each month. Report lists line item, federal stock number, opening balance, receipts, issues, closing balance, number of demands, and quantity demanded. Forwarded with this report are copies of all receipt and issue documents for the same reporting period. This reporting system provides data that would be a maximum of 8 days old with the average age of transactions being 4 days.

RECOMMENDATION: Continuation of the manual system until such time that faster computer cycles and printouts can provide data as up-to-date as the manual system; when this occurs, a return should be made to the computer system.

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(2) (U) Ammunition

(a) (U) ITEM: DODAC Master Stock Records

OBSERVATION: 1. In-puts for prior planning of receipts and distribution of Class V assets were not available.

2. The necessity of obtaining data through numerous phone calls, messengers and continuous liaison, with Long Binh Ammunition Supply Depot Stock Records Section.

3. There was extensive duplication of effort in maintaining transportation reports, informal stock record accounts and other management data.

EVALUATION: The ACofS, Ammunition, USASUPCOM, SGN has the responsibility for planning and control of Class V supplies to insure the availability of correct types of ammunition in sufficient quantity at the proper locations to support tactical operations in the III and IV CTZ. One of the prime tools needed to fulfill this responsibility is a reliable and readily available Department of the Army Ammunition Code (DODAC) Master Stock Record deck. The deck is the master record of all Class V stocks on hand with each DODAC broken out by ASPs. Prior to 4 May 1969 the DODAC Master Stock Records for the USASUPCOM, SGN were maintained by the 3d Ordnance Battalion at Long Binh Ammunition Supply Depot. Under this system ASPs reported transactions to Battalion with extracts forwarded to ACofS, Ammunition USASUPCOM, SGN and 1st Logistical Command. Under this system the possibilities of error were increased due to the transcription and further extraction of information to higher headquarters. Additionally it was not the responsibility of the battalion to manage or establish command stockage objectives. It was evident that the ACofS, Ammunition should control the command stock records. By order of the Commanding General, USASUPCOM, SGN, the DODAC Master Stock Records and personnel were transferred and attached to the ACofS, Ammunition on 4 May 1969.

RECOMMENDATION: That command stocks records be maintained by the staff ammunition officer having responsibility for management of command Class V stocks.

(b) (U) ITEM: Positive unit identification coupled with date and time group against monthly allocations.

OBSERVATION: Using units were drawing allocated ammunition items on the last day, but after closing time of allocation period (1800 hours 24th of

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each month) causing confusion in postings against the correct allocations month.

EVALUATION: Items of ammunition whose availability is not unlimited are managed through a system of allocations to major commands. These commands in turn break out allotments to their units. All unused allocations at the end of the ammunition month (1800 hours on the 24th of each month) revert to the general stock pile as command assets. The time lag between issue and recording on stock records caused some question as to exact period of credit charge. To obviate this doubtful grey area the ACofS, Ammunition, this headquarters, instituted the addition of date and time group to every ammunition transportation order honored on the 24th day of each month. Additionally, complete unit identity instead of only major command designation is now annotated. The above has resulted in plaudits from IIFV.

RECOMMENDATION: That this system of audit identity coupled with date and time group be adopted throughout the 1st Logistical Command.

(3) (U) Supply

(a) (U) ITEM: Supply Procedures

OBSERVATION: Instead of the MILSTRIP System, a local supply directive numeration system was in force.

EVALUATION: In order to reduce a ponderous numerical arrangement of bookkeeping, a local system of supply directives, wherein many items could be listed on one directive, was effected. However, the audit trail is rapidly lost since the supplying agency must change the supply directive number into a TCN number. Additionally, multiple orders on one supply directive are difficult to discern, since TCNs are single line release items. This makes tracing of any specific item a tedious project. Institution of the MILSTRIP permits rapid transmission, unequivocal information, positive identification, and simple location of any precise record or supply action in order to get rapid status of shipment in an extremely pervasive system.

RECOMMENDATION: That local supply systems not be adopted regardless of apparent ease of bookkeeping to the originator.

(b) (U) ITEM: Reduction of Perishable Rations Stocked at Depot Level.

OBSERVATION: The high level of stockage of perishable rations maintained at depot level caused significant difficulties in rotating stocks and costly delays in unloading refrigerated vessels.

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EVALUATION: The frequency of shipment and relative certainty of arrival of shipments of refrigerated rations from CONUS has enabled a reduction in stockage of perishable rations at the depot level. The reduction has increased the net amount of refrigerated storage space at the depot, enabling incoming refrigerated vessels to be unloaded quicker and facilitating the rotation of stocks.

RECOMMENDATION: That an effort be made to insure the timely arrival of shipments of non-perishable rations from CONUS. At present, non-perishables are shipped from CONUS on general cargo vessels on a space available basis which results in the shipments arriving before or after the required delivery date. This situation has resulted in large excesses or shortages of items, condemnation losses, substitutions and has also greatly contributed to the difficulty of efficiently managing non-perishable stocks.

## (4) (U) Maintenance

ITEM: Change in status of Materiel Readiness Expeditors (MRE)

OBSERVATION: As of 26 May 1969 MREs were no longer allowed to make depot searches for repair parts or allowed to initiate high priority requisitions at the depot.

EVALUATION: Since curtailment of MRE activities, the depot has shown fewer hand carries resulting in man hours saved, fewer warehouse denials and a decrease in the inventory adjustment with no decrease in the number of requests filled by depot. The command deadline has not increased since curtailment of MRE activities.

RECOMMENDATION: That MREs continue to be denied access to depot storage areas and that MREs not be allowed to initiate requests at depot level.

## (5) (U) Services

ITEM: Increased PDO Sales

OBSERVATION: The property disposal yards at Vung Tau and Ho Nai have cut their inventory in half during the past three months. This has been due to a continuing increase in releases to MAP countries such as Korea and Taiwan. In addition the PDO has advertised large quantities of material for sale.

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EVALUATION: At the present time both PDO yards are doing an outstanding job. The PDO yard at Ho Nai in particular, with its vast quantities of input and output, are managing to keep pace with the flow of material. Through a continuous program of putting material up for sale and expeditious movement of sold material, the Ho Nai PDO yard should continue to reduce its inventory. Also with the installation of specialized property disposal equipment, a more efficient operation will exist. The installation of the scales should be accomplished as soon as possible as there is presently no accurate means of measuring the tonnage removed from the Ho Nai disposal yard.

RECOMMENDATION: A continuing effort should be made to put material up for sale as it has been in the past. Maximum utilization of the in-country MAAG teams should be recognized as a valuable source of asset reduction. A continued command emphasis will be required to insure that facilities at the property disposal yards are improved; this is particularly true in the installation of the scales at the Ho Nai yard. If these scales are not installed promptly, this will result in a tremendous loss of money to the US Government. The scales are scheduled for installation in September 1969.

- f. (U) Organization. None
- g. (C) Redeployment Activities
  - (1) (C) Operations
  - (a) (C) ITEM: "Hot Lines"

OBSERVATION: Problems exist in large scale unit redeployment which require timely resolution. The dial telephone system used in RVN is not responsive when used off post.

EVALUATION: "Hot Lines", or point to point telephone circuits have proven invaluable in providing information and instructions to, and receiving logistical intelligence from the USASUPCOM, SGN team in support of the 9th Infantry Division redeployment at Dong Tam.

RECOMMENDATION: That point to point telephone circuits be used in future large scale unit redeployments.

- (b) (U) ITEM: Holding Areas

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OBSERVATION: Holding areas for redeploying troops are required at the departure airfield if the airfield is used for redeployment at night.

EVALUATION: The move out of Bien Hoa Airfield was relatively smooth and constant because it was solely a daylight operation. If airfields in future moves are to be used on a 24 hour basis there is a definite need for a holding area at or near the airfield. The holding area should have adequate billet and mess facilities for a minimum of 800 men or one battalion. The area should include facilities for movies, customs inspection and money changing. The area should be isolated from all other facilities to preclude the possibility of the men acquiring drugs or VD at the last minute. Adequate communications and transportation to the airfield are also necessary for an efficient operation.

RECOMMENDATION: That a holding area be established and operated if a redeployment airfield is to be used at night.

(c) (C) ITEM: Residual Units

OBSERVATION: Residual Units should be moved first.

EVALUATION: Whenever possible, residual units that are co-located with units which are redeploying should be moved first, or at least as early as possible, so the installation may be closed or turned over to ARVN as soon as the last redeploying unit has cleared.

RECOMMENDATION: That residual units be moved first when an installation is to be closed or turned over to ARVN as a result of redeployment.

(d) (C) ITEM: Movement Plans

OBSERVATION: Movement plans for units redeploying from the 9th Infantry Division were generally inaccurate or non-existent.

EVALUATION: All units should have accurate up to date movement plans to include packing and preservation materials required in order to assist planners in identifying all transportation requirements in a timely manner.

RECOMMENDATION: That HQ, USARV emphasize the fact that all units must have accurate up to date movement plans.

(e) (U) ITEM: Classification, Packing and Preservation Training

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OBSERVATION: Most personnel within the Army are not trained in the fundamentals of classification, preservation and packing procedures.

EVALUATION: Although supervisory personnel may be expected to be available to assist units which are redeploying, these personnel require the assistance of unit members who have fundamental skills in classification, preservation and packing procedures.

RECOMMENDATION: When a unit is alerted for redeployment it should receive immediate instruction in fundamental classification, preservation and packing procedures.

## (f) (U) ITEM: Contract Losses

OBSERVATION: Redeployments may cause a monetary loss to the Government from civilian contracts.

EVALUATION: At present contracts with civilian firms run from July to July and must be negotiated far in advance of the starting date. Of interest here is the contract which has been negotiated for a given number of tankers and barges and contains a heavy termination clause. In as much as this command received little warning of the redeployment of the 9th Infantry Division and that division is a major user of POL in the Delta, there is a possibility that the contract or portions thereof may be terminated, thereby causing a monetary loss to the Government.

RECOMMENDATION: That whenever possible, future contracts be negotiated for shorter periods or without termination clauses.

## (2) (U) Logistics

### (a) (U) Ammunition

1. (U) ITEM: Surveillance inspection of base camps and fire support sites.

OBSERVATION: Surveillance inspectors should visit base camps and fire support sites to inspect basic loads of Class V prior to turn-in to ASP.

EVALUATION: Prior to standdown of deploying units a 9th Division representative and an ammunition inspector visited unit base camps and fire support sites. Purpose of visit was to determine condition of ammunition and to assist and instruct in proper procedure for preparing ammunition for turn-in and destruction of unserviceable ammunition. The results of the visits were rewarding. Only minimum quantities of unserviceable ammunition were turned in to the ASP. Majority of unit turn-ins were in proper pack reducing the hazards associated with unit returns.



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RECOMMENDATION: That prior to standdown of deploying units, a team composed of an ammunition inspector, an EOD trained NCO and a representative of the higher Headquarters Division Ammunition Office contact and advise the unit.

## 2. (U). ITEM: Unit returns

OBSERVATION: Integration of the supply and attrition program of ammunition during standdown phase of units selected for deployment requires intensive management of personnel and assets.

EVALUATION: Effective coordination was made between the Dong Tam ASP and the 9th Division to schedule supply of ammunition to the deploying units. This enabled the deploying units to call smaller quantities forward and to deplete basic loads through attrition, thereby reducing quantities of ammunition on hand at time of standdown. Simultaneously the supporting ASP was able to reduce its stock and dispose of excesses. Additionally, EOD personnel disposed of unserviceable ammunition at base camps, thus reducing the hazards of transporting ammunition in questionable condition to the ASPs.

RECOMMENDATION: That future standdown of units be coordinated with the DAO and the Ammunition Supply Point so that resupply of Class V can be scheduled at a rate less than the daily requirements in order to assure basic load consumption.

## (b) (U) Supply

ITEM: Operation Groove

OBSERVATION: Redeployment of US units requires considerable coordination between this headquarters, US Army Depot, Long Binh, and the deploying units. Assistance in obtaining supplies on extremely short notice from the depot is frequently required.

EVALUATION: This headquarters does not have the capability of initiating supply documents. In order to satisfy these immediate requirements, a block of document numbers must be obtained from a direct support unit as an authorized customer of the USADLB. Personnel from this office then use these document numbers to initiate requisitions and expedite supply action to satisfy the immediate requirements received through liaison people on the ground with the deploying unit. This system has proven to be workable. However, the assumption of this mission by this headquarters is not in keeping with the present organization.

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RECOMMENDATION: That deploying units provide this headquarters with a qualified supply representative to perform liaison and provide a single point contact for the special requirements of the deploying unit. This office would give assistance to this representative in expeditious of immediate requirements from the US Army Depot Long Binh.

(c) (U) Maintenance

ITEM: Hydro Jet Water Pumps

OBSERVATION: The hydro jet water pump cannot provide the service required unless supported with an additional pump and filters to clean the water.

EVALUATION: The hydro jet pump is a high pressure, low volume pump that must be operated within a very small temperature range. An input pressure of at least 40 PSI is required to force enough water into the main pump to maintain the proper operating temperature. A clean water source or a series of filters is required to prevent damage to the pump.

RECOMMENDATION: That the hydro jet pumps not be used for extensive cleaning. That a high volume, low pressure pump be used for the cleaning requirements within a CC&S activity or staging area to prepare equipment for retrograde out of country.

(d) (C) Transportation

1. (C) ITEM: Transportation Operations Center: (TROC)

OBSERVATION: In the course of a division, or comparable sized unit move, many transportation elements (Movement Control, Motor Transport, Traffic Management, Port, Air, Rail and Staff) may be involved. Controls must be exercised through a single transportation element to coordinate the efforts of these transportation elements for optimum efficiency, economy of effort and harmonious teamwork.

EVALUATION: In the case of the retrograde movement of the 9th Infantry Division, the complex task of coordinating and synchronizing the combined efforts, on site, of the 3d Transportation Center, 4th Transportation Command, 48th Transportation Group, TMA and Transportation Staff, was solved by establishing a "Transportation Operations Center" (TROC) at Dong Tam. The function of the TROC is to serve as a "clearing house" and point of central coordination, on site, for all participating transportation elements. The TROC need not enter into normal command chains, nor should it. It

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functions through cooperative effort and the ready interchange of vital information among the participating agencies, allowing each agency to take advantage of the "pooled" knowledge of all, and thereby promoting better transportation decisions.

RECOMMENDATION: Future planning for the redeployment of major units should include provisions for the activation, at an early stage in preparations for a "Transportation Operations Center" (or comparable designation) on site with the unit to be moved. The TROC should remain operational, and co-located with the unit to be moved, until the unit move is completed.

## 2. (C) ITEM: Local Haul Transportation:

OBSERVATION: During the "Standdown" of a major organizational element (such as a division) which has been the operator of, as well as the principal tenant on, an overseas installation, provision must be made for the supporting logistical agency to assume "post, camp and station" transportation support upon the standdown of the departing organization's organic transportation capability without disruption of service or impairment of the out-processing schedule.

EVALUATION: The 9th Infantry Division has operated its own Base Camp Installation at Dong Tam, Vietnam. Upon receipt of redeployment orders, the 9th Infantry Division, in coordination with USASUPCOM, SGN, developed a time-phased movement schedule. The headquarters arranged to provide transportation elements organic to USASUPCOM, SGN (a light truck platoon, water tanker, POL tankers and bus support) to perform "post, camp and station" transportation functions at Dong Tam effective upon the start of "standdown" of the division's own S&T Battalion. In this manner, continuity of service was maintained without "missing a beat". The management of this transportation service is exercised by USASUPCOM, SGN allowing the division to concentrate on its preparations for movement.

RECOMMENDATION: Future planning for division or comparable sized unit retrograde moves should include definite provisions for continuity of logistical support, particularly transportation, of the type generally rendered by posts, camps, stations, or internal elements of the unit to be moved.

## h. (U) Other

Comptroller

ITEM: Finance Support for Divisional Units

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Support Command, Saigon  
for the Period Ending 31 July 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (RL) (U)

OBSERVATION: Prior to the announced redeployment of elements of the 9th Infantry Division, finance support to nondivisional units in the Dong Tam area was provided by the 9th Infantry Division Finance Office. Withdrawal of the Division Finance Office means that support for these nondivisional units must be obtained from other sources. The remaining brigade and supporting units of the 9th Infantry Division will be supported by a brigade finance office, however, no support will be available for others than divisional units. A further complication exists in that most of the nondivisional troops located at Dong Tam are being relocated, either up country or within the Delta region.


EVALUATION: With division finance offices providing support to non-divisional units, transfer of pay responsibility will cause problems each time the division moves, whether in-country or out of country. In the case of the redeployment of the 9th Infantry Division planning is progressing smoothly for assumption of the pay responsibility. At present there are approximately 2200 accounts to be taken over. The major drawback to completion of a final plan of transfer lies in not knowing the future locations of the pay accounts involved. If the 2200 accounts are placed with the Can Tho Class "B" Office no major problems will be experienced. However, if the Class "B" Office at Vinh Long has to assume responsibility for some of the accounts, space limitations pose a serious problem.

RECOMMENDATION: The current policy of having non-divisional troops paid by division finance offices should be re-examined. Redeployment of the 9th Infantry Division has pointed out the fact that each time a division finance office moves, realignment of finance support will be required. This will present a series of recurring adjustments that could be minimized if area support of non-divisional units were fully utilized.

TEL: LBN 2604

5 Incl  
as

Incls 1, 2, 4 and 5 wd HQ, DA

  
ARTHUR HUROW  
Brigadier General, USA  
Commanding

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AVCA GO-MH (28 Aug 69) 1 Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the USASUPCOM, COM for Period  
Ending 31 July 1969 RCS CSFOR-65. (U)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384.

28 SEP 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375.

1. (U) The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, USASUPCOM, Saigon for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 is forwarded.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning Unit Reassignments, page 16, paragraph a(1).

(1) Paragraph a(1)(a): Nonconcur. It cannot be assumed that the mission of the units identified for movement will be approximately the same at the new duty station.

(2) Paragraph a(1)(b): Nonconcur. Shipment of individuals with less than 30 days retainability at the time of movement would create useless turbulence adding to the already rapid turnover of personnel in USARV.

(3) Paragraph a(1)(c): Nonconcur. The units to be reassigned are selected by ACoFS, SP&amp;O, based on authorization versus mission in the new organization; therefore, reassignments must be based on authorization of relocated units.

(4) Paragraph a(1)(d): Concur. Information regarding relocation of units is passed to the support command as soon as it is made available.

b. Reference item concerning Malutilization of Enlisted Personnel, page 17, paragraph 2a(2). Concur. Action has been taken to reestablish the criteria by which a man is considered malutilized to conform with figure 3-1, AR 600-200.

c. Reference item concerning Reenlistments within Vietnam for Duty and Training, page 17, paragraph a(3). Nonconcur. It is felt that deferring training of an individual after he returns to CONUS or other areas would definitely hurt the reenlistment program in RVN. The main purpose for reenlisting is that the applicant desires training at the time he reenlists, which is a reenlistment selling point. Some MOS's are difficult to train an individual in, especially the ACGPS referred to in item 3 (U), however, this is not true in all MOS's. Most of the ACGPS requested thru 1st Log Comd RECAP Program are in MOS's that can be trained here in RVN. Since retention of qualified individuals is the main goal of our reenlistment program it is necessary to retain the current in-country program. If a unit does not have the training capability to provide for OJT for an individual for certain ACGPS, a list of those units and ACGPS should be noted.

d. Reference item concerning Consolidated Logistical Training, page 19, paragraph 1b. Concur. Action required at higher headquarters.

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
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AVCA GO-MH (28 Aug 69) 1 Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the USASUPCOM, SGN for Period Ending 31 July 1969 RCS CSFOR-6 .(E)

- e. Reference item concerning Assembly Line Method, page 19, paragraph d(1). Concur. Centralized assembly line operations provide an efficient means of processing a large quantity of equipment and affords a high degree of standardization of the equipment processing procedures. Once established, the assembly line method can process equipment at a much faster rate than other methods. 1st Log Comd will provide qualified technical supervisors when requested.
- f. Reference item concerning Technical Inspections and Classification, page 20, paragraph d(3). Concur. Correct technical inspections and classification can only be performed by personnel trained and qualified to perform this function. The lowest level at which qualified inspectors are assigned is Direct Support, therefore, a DSU or higher level of maintenance support must perform the necessary inspections and classifications. No action required by higher headquarters.
- g. Reference item concerning Preservation Materials, page 20, paragraph d(4). Nonconcur. Coordination with ICCV indicates only 10 FSN's for barrier paper on ABF. Barrier paper is stocked in various widths and is used for various purposes. It can be waterproof, greaseproof or both. Depending on the type of paper required and the type of the equipment to be protected, the size can range from 12" wide to 148" wide. While it would be possible to standardize all barrier papers to one size and type, this standardization would prove extremely expensive and generate much wasted preservation material.
- h. Reference item concerning Package POL Inventory Management System, page 21, paragraph e(1). Concur. Recommendation is currently command policy and manual system of inventory management of packaged POL is in effect in all support commands.
- i. Reference item concerning DODAC Master Stock Records, page 22, paragraph e(2)(a). Concur. Command stock records must be maintained by the staff element having the responsibility for management of command Class V stocks. The structure desired by each support command is tailored to the needs of that command. Thus, the establishment of the command stock records section within each SUPCOM is at the discretion of Support Command Commander, ACoFS, Ammunition, and Battalion Commander. No action required by higher headquarters.
- j. Reference item concerning positive unit identification coupled with date and time group against monthly allocations, page 22, paragraph e(2)(b). Concur in that the use of the Unit Identification Code (UIC) to identify the drawing unit, has been initiated throughout 1st Logistical Command ammunition units. Concur in the adoption of use of date time group along with the UIC on the daily transaction report for Saigon Support Command. The problem now exists in that Support Command only. If other SUPCOMs experience the same problem, this solution will be recommended to them. No action required by higher headquarters.

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AVCA GJ-MH (28 Aug 69) 1 Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the USASUPCOM, SGN for Period  
Ending 31 July 1969 RCS CSFOR-65. (U)

k. Reference item concerning Reduction of Perishable Rations Stocked at Depot Level, page 23, paragraph 3(b). 1st Log Command is aware of the receipt of early and late shipments of nonperishable subsistence and the problems they cause. The CG, 1st Log Command, sent a message dated 10 July 1969 to DPSC stating his concern over this situation. To correct this situation, an interface has been established with ICO-P to assist this headquarters in monitoring all shipments of nonperishables from CONUS. DA has also shown a strong interest in correcting the receipt of early and late shipments of nonperishables and is querying the responsible CONUS agency when these errant shipments occur. These corrective measures should assure more timely arrival of nonperishable subsistence which will allow a reduction of stockage objectives and safety levels for these items.

l. Reference item concerning Material Readiness Expeditors (MRE), page 24, paragraph e(4). Nonconcur. 1st Log Comd (U) message 14239 DTG 260100Z Aug 69, subject as above outlined this command's position regarding MRE's. Message recommended to USARV that:

- (1) MRE's be allowed to conduct depot searches under the supervision of depot personnel.
- (2) Senior enlisted personnel (E-6 and above) be allowed to perform MRE duty.
- (3) Any direct depot customer, regardless of size, should be authorized on MRE.
- (4) Approval be obtained from SUPCOM CO prior to assigning an MRE to a depot.
- (5) MRE's must be technically qualified to identify their respective material and be knowledgeable of the supply and depot operations.

USARV is currently staffing draft regulation 700-24, subject as above, which will incorporate above cited recommendations.

m. Reference item concerning Increased PDQ Sales, page 24, paragraph e(5). Concur. All actions taken by Saigon Support Command have been the most direct and expeditious solution to inventory problems. The installation of truck scales at Ho Nai is pending approval at HQ, USARV. The Sales & Disposal Division, is placing increasing emphasis on the MAPEX program thus facilitating the removal of even greater amounts of MAPEX property.

n. Reference item concerning Movement Plans, page 26, paragraph g(1)(d). Concur. 1st Log Comd has reviewed all retrograde procedures as a result of Keystone Eagle. IC OPORD 183 contains implementing instructions for Log Comd units alerted for redeployment or supporting redeployment. Movement plans are required by IC OPORD 183 (App3 to Annex C).

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the USASUPCOM, SGN for Period Ending 31 July 1969 RCS CSFOR-65. (U)

o. Reference item concerning Classifications, Packing and Preservation Training, page 26, paragraph g(1)(e). Concur. This headquarters is preparing a program of instruction with a view to formation of instructor teams to be dispatched to deploying units to provide the desired instruction.

p. Reference item concerning Contract Losses, page 27, paragraph g(1)(f). Nonconcur. Negotiation of contracts for periods of less than one year can result in many added costs to the Government. The administrative cost is doubled whenever a contract is solicited and awarded twice within a year rather than once. In addition, the Government pays more for a shorter term contract. A contractor would include in his price certain "start-up" costs incurred regardless of the length of the contract term. Thus, e.g., a 6-month contract would cost more per unit of supply or service than a 12-month contract. Termination clauses used are mandatorily prescribed by Section 8, ASPR. ASPR 8-705 allows use of a short form termination for convenience clause in fixed-price service contracts under circumstances specified therein. The only termination cost to the Government under the provisions of this clause is payment for services rendered prior to the effective date of termination. USAPAV is presently using the short form termination clause in all firm fixed-price service contracts.

q. Reference item concerning Surveillance inspection of base camps and fire support sites, page 27, paragraph g(2)(a)1. Concur. This should be the standing operating procedure for all support commands and not limited only to standdowns, but performed on a periodic basis to all supported units. This headquarters will disseminate this lesson learned to all support commands via the Ammunition Activity Summary Letter published monthly. No action required by higher headquarters.

r. Reference item concerning Unit returns, page 28, paragraph g(2)(a)2. Concur. This technique will be incorporated in future redeployment plans. No action required by higher headquarters.

s. Reference item concerning Operation Groove, page 28, paragraph g(2)(b). Concur. This headquarters recognizes the importance of a deploying unit liaison officer. Instructions presented at the 18 August Freighter Cargo conference held at this headquarters informed all support commands of the necessity for a point of contact with the deploying unit. Intent of this liaison officer would be to prepare and coordinate requisitions under standard MILSTRIP format for submission to the USAD Freighter Cargo Officer. It is recommended that in future OPODs, HQ, USARV direct appointment of a Redeploying Unit Supply/Freighter Cargo Liaison Officer for this specific purpose.

t. Reference item concerning Hydro Jet Water Pumps, page 29, paragraph g(2)(c). Concur. A high volume, low pressure pump will adequately clean equipment for out-of-country retrograde. American Water Blasters are currently



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being used to clean retrograde equipment and will be available for use during  
future retrograde operations. No action required by higher headquarters.

u. Reference item concerning Finance Support for Divisional Units, page 30,  
paragraph h. Concur. Action required by HQ, USARV.

3. (U) Concur with the basic report as modified by this indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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C. D. STAFFORD  
1Lt, AGC  
Asst Adjutant General

CF:  
USASUPCOM, SGN

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AVHGC-DST (28 Aug 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Support Command, Saigon for  
the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 17 OCT 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Saigon.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (U) Reference item concerning "Reconciliation of Records and Reports", section II, page 18, paragraph 2a(4); concur. USARV will conduct a one time evaluation of this project and if proven successful will recommend Army-wide implementation.

b. (U) Reference item concerning "Consolidated Logistical Training", section II, page 19, paragraph 2b; concur. A USARV regulation on logistics training will soon be published. One of the objectives of the regulation is to identify the magnitude of logistics training and offer assistance to units which cannot conduct this training from within their own resources. The concept of a centralized logistics training activity has considerable merit in view of the magnitude of logistics operations in RVN. Consideration is also being given to a mobile instruction team or teams consisting of qualified officers and NCOs who would conduct courses of short duration where the need exists. Attempts will be made at Headquarters, USARV to resolve this problem taking into account such things as manning levels, space authorization, and establishment of a new activity within the Headquarters.

c. (C) Reference item concerning "Holding Areas", section II, page 25, paragraph 2g(1)(b); concur. Exception is taken to the size and the extent of services to be provided in a temporary holding area as proposed in this ORLL. Proper scheduling of troop movement will permit maximum retention of troops in base camp areas prior to movement to APOEs. Experience gained during Keystone Eagle indicates that moves can be planned to preclude extensive delays at the APOE. Further, scheduling of out-of-country airlift can be accomplished with minimum number of missions during the hours of darkness, which would also reduce holding requirements at the APOEs.

d. (U) Reference item concerning "Operation Groove", section II, page 28, paragraph 2g(2)(b); concur. If units submit their accurate requirements for this materiel prior to standdown, short notice requisitions can be kept to a minimum. In addition, USARV OPLAN 183-69 requires that Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command designate an individual as point-of-contact to operate

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
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Support Command, Saigon for  
the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

in the immediate vicinity of the redeploying or inactivating unit. This individual could be supply oriented and perform the duties as point-of-contact between the redeploying unit and depot thereby expediting short notice requisitions.

e. (U) Reference item concerning "Transportation Operations Center", section II, page 29, paragraph 2g(2)(d)1; concur. The Transportation Operations Center (TROC) concept proved effective during the retrograde movement of the 9th Infantry Division. The TROC should remain operational, not only until the unit move is completed, but until unit equipment, supplies, post, camp, and station property, etc., have been properly disposed of.

f. (U) Reference item concerning "Comptroller", section II, page 30, paragraph 2h; concur. The policy of paying nondivisional troops by division finance officers is currently being studied with the objective of transferring this responsibility to nontactical finance officers. The 2,200 pay accounts maintained by the 9th Infantry Division were transferred to the Can Tho Class "B" office without difficulty.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

 *may, ALC*  
C. D. WILSON  
1LT, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:  
USA Spt Cmd, Sgn  
1st Log Cmd

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GPOP-DT (28 Aug 69) 3d Ind


SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, US Army Support Command, Saigon,  
for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 25 NOV 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310


This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

  
D. A. TUCKER  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

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-----OPERATIONAL CONTROL IS RETAINED WITH PARENT UNIT.

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SEPARATED FROM BASIC  
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